

tory sentences both at once cannot express a true assertion," this is no doubt quite undeniable, and it is also undeniable that generally it is only to sentences that "the Law of Contradiction can be made applicable, since examples of assertion take of necessity the form of sentences". But it remains true, that the 'abstract' Law of Contradiction is supreme, and we have to take every means in our power—by careful thought and careful use of words—to ensure that we do not through lapse of memory, or vagueness, or stupidity, or by slipshod use of language, infringe it. Sentences are not mere sentences, and if sentences contradictory in expression, are not contradictory in meaning, then the expression used needs reform—for even granting that the speaker himself never intends a contradiction, if the forms he uses are contradictory, a hearer may no doubt attribute a contradiction to him, and he is also liable to confuse himself.

Mr. Sidgwick's positive doctrine certainly seems to me to be original, full of interest and suggestion, and of real practical value and importance for the avoidance of "bad reasoning". He would allow that much confusion of thought is no doubt due to ignorance, idleness, forgetfulness, want of wide grasp, clear vision, and power of concentration, in the individual mind, rather than to those shortcomings of the average mind which have infected language—but in all cases the *word* is the only convenient handle by which to lay hold of thought, and pin it down for investigation. That all "good reasoning"—when we have got it—goes into the forms of traditional Logic is of course admitted, and I am of opinion that an express theory of good reasoning is in itself extraordinary interest, if only as formulating what we do or try to do all our lives, and that in all the trouble that we take to clear up in detail our own thoughts or those of others, we have this ideal in view.

In brief, I think that there is room and need both for a theory of good reasoning (though the theories we have may be open to improvement), and for a practical art of avoiding bad reasoning—and that perhaps no one has made more valuable contributions to the latter than the author of the book of which in the foregoing pages I have been attempting to give some account.

E. E. CONSTANCE JONES.

The Limits of Evolution and Other Essays Illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism. By G. H. HOWISON, LL.D., Mills Professor of Philosophy in the University of California. New York: Macmillan, 1901. Pp. xxxvi, 396.

THE essays contained in this volume are seven in number: The Limits of Evolution; Modern Science and Pantheism; Later German Philosophy; The Art Principle as Represented in Poetry; The Right Relation of Reason to Religion; Human Immortality,

Its Positive Argument; and the Harmony of Determinism and Freedom. The connexion between them consists in their illustration of a metaphysical system which is, in many respects, so novel that it will be well to begin by quoting almost the whole of the summary given in the Preface.¹

" I. All existence is either (1) the existence of *minds*, or (2) the existence of *the items and order of their experience*; all the existences known as 'material' consisting in certain of these experiences, with an order organised by the self-active forms of consciousness that in their unity constitute the substantial being of a mind, in distinction from its phenomenal life.

" II. Accordingly, Time and Space, and all that both 'contain,' owe their entire existence to the essential correlation and co-existence of minds. This co-existence is not to be thought of as either their simultaneity or their contiguity. It is not at all spatial, nor temporal, but must be regarded as simply *their logical implication of each other in the self-defining consciousness of each*. And this recognition of each other as all alike self-determining, renders *their co-existence a moral order*.

" III. These many minds, being in this natural recognition of their moral reality the determining ground of all events and all mere 'things,' form the eternal (*i.e.*, unconditionally real) world, and by a fitting metaphor, consecrated to the usage of ages, they may be said to constitute the 'City of God'. In this, all the members have the equality belonging to their common aim of fulfilling their one Rational Ideal; and God, the fulfilled Type of every mind, the living Bond of their union, reigns in it, not by the exercise of power, but solely by light; not by authority, but by reason; not by efficient, but by final causation,—that is, simply by being the impersonated Ideal of every mind.

" IV. The members of this Eternal Republic have no origin but their purely logical one of reference to each other, including thus their primary reference to God. That is, in the literal sense of the word, they have no origin at all—no source in *time* whatever. There is nothing at all, prior to them, out of which their being arises,—they are not 'things' in the chain of efficient causation. They simply *are*, and together constitute the eternal order.

" V. Still, they exist only in and through their mutually thought correlation, their eternal 'City,' and out of it would be non-existent. But through their thought-reciprocity with each other, God being included in the circle, they are the ground of all literally originated, all temporal and spatial existences.

" VI. Hence, relatively to the natural world, they are free, in the sense of being in control of it: so far from being bound *by* it and its laws, they are the very source of all the law there is or can be in it. Relatively to God also, and to each other, all minds other than God are free, in the still higher sense that

¹ P. xii. The italics are the author's.

nothing but their own light and conviction determines their actions toward each other or toward God. This freedom belongs to every one of them in their total or eternal reality, be it burdened and obscured as it may in the world of their temporal experience; and its intrinsic tendency must be to fulfil itself in this external world also.

“VII. This Pluralism held in union by reason, this World of Spirits, is thus the genuine *Unmoved One that moves all Things*. Not the solitary God, but the whole World of Spirits including God, and united through recognition of him, is the real ‘Prime Mover’ of which since the culmination of Greek philosophy we have heard so much. . . .

“IX. These several conceptions, founded in the idea of the World of Spirits as a circuit of moral relationship, carry with them a profound change in our habitual notions of the creative office of God. Creation, so far as it can be an office of God towards other spirits, is not an *event*—not an act causative and effective in *time*. It is not an *occurrence*, dated at some instant in the life of God, after the lapse of æons of his solitary being. God has no being subject to time, such as we have; nor is the fundamental relation which minds bear to him a temporal relation. So far as it concerns minds, then, *creation must simply mean the eternal fact that God is a complete moral agent*, that his essence is just a perfect CONSCIENCE—the immutable recognition of the world of spirits as having each a reality as inexpugnable as his own, as sacred as his own, with rights to be revered; supremely, the right of self-direction from personal conviction. This immutable perfection of the moral recognition by God, let it be repeated, is the living Bond in the whole world of spirits. Did it not exist, did God not exist, there would be, there could be, no such world; there could be no other spirit at all. *Real creation, then, means such an eternal dependence of other souls upon God that the non-existence of God would involve the non-existence of all souls, while his existence is the essential supplementing Reality that raises them to reality; without him, they would be but void names and bare possibilities*. Thus in the Divine office designated ‘Creation,’ exactly as in that denoted by ‘Redemption’ or ‘Regeneration,’ the word is a metaphor; but in the one case as in the other, it symbolises a reality, eternal and essential, of a significance no less than stupendous.

“X. The key to the whole view is fixed in its doctrine concerning the *system* of causation. It reduces Efficient Cause from that supreme place in philosophy which this has hitherto held, and gives the highest, the organising place to Final Cause instead. Final Cause becomes now not merely the guiding and regulative, but actually the grounding and constitutive principle of real existence; all the other causes, Material, Formal, Efficient, become its *derivatives* as well as the objects of its systematising control.”

Such is the system which Dr. Howison expounds in this work—

not very systematically, but still with great clearness, and with a force and enthusiasm which never become merely hortatory. The standpoint throughout is that of a student, and not of a preacher. Nor is the system unworthy of enthusiasm. There is much in it which it would be good to believe. It establishes immortality on a far firmer basis than is possible on the more common theory by which men are only the creatures (in the ordinary sense, not Dr. Howison's) of a God who is the sole Supreme Reality. "It is impossible for God to be God, apart from souls and their immortality and freedom" (p. 75). And, on the other hand, it offers a God of whom personality, morality and affection can reasonably be predicated, since, though perfect, he is finite. (I am not sure if Dr. Howison would accept the word finite, but in effect, it seems to me, he holds God to be finite, since he makes him one of a community of spirits, each of whom has "a reality as inexpugnable as his own".)

The proof naturally falls into two divisions. (1) Is the ultimate reality a "City of God," consisting of a plurality of finite and eternal beings, of whom each of us is one? This, according to Dr. Howison, is, in logical order, the first question to be answered. And then (2) is one of these Spirits a perfect being, the type and end of all the rest, who may fitly be called God?

For the first of the problems Dr. Howison thinks that a solution can be found in the demonstration of an Idealism closely resembling Kant's. "Our discussion," he says (p. 304), "in proving Time to be an expression of each mind's spontaneous activity, proves the self-active existence of every mind as such, and so establishes the eternity of the individual spirit in the only ultimate meaning of eternity; since as the ground and source of Time itself, the being of the soul must transcend Time, though including Time."

Two points suggest themselves here. The first is that, while Dr. Howison follows Kant up to a certain stage, he then abruptly separates himself from him. He treats Time as an *a priori* form of experience, and draws Kant's conclusion that the self cannot be in Time. But Kant goes on from this to the further conclusion that the self cannot be known at all by the Pure Reason, while Dr. Howison, on the other hand, maintains that it can be known by the Pure Reason to exist, and to exist eternally. It would surely have been better if Dr. Howison had given his reasons for rejecting his master's criticisms on the Paralogism of Pure Reason. As far as I can see he simply ignores them.

The other point is perhaps more serious. Time is an expression of each mind's spontaneous activity, and, therefore, if I understand the argument rightly, it cannot apply to the mind itself. But surely such ideas as Unity, Plurality, Final Causality, Organic Unity, are in the same position. These are clearly not part of the matter of intuition, and what else, on the principles of Kant and Dr. Howison, can they be except forms of experience? Yet the latter does not regard the self as transcending them, for he describes the selves, and the City of God which they constitute, in

terms of those ideas, while refusing to describe them in terms of Time. He has doubtless good reasons—many could be suggested—for treating these categories as more adequate to reality than Time is, but they are not brought out, as far as I can see, anywhere in the book.

I cannot but think that Dr. Howison could have proved his position much more strongly if he had started from Fichte or Hegel instead of Kant. We are told in the Preface (p. xxvii.) that the earlier essays were originally more Hegelian, but that this element was eliminated when the author became aware of the hopeless contradiction between Hegelian monism and the affirmation of personal reality and individual freedom. I doubt very much whether any monism to be found in Hegel's Logic is incompatible with personal reality and individual freedom. But even if my doubt is unfounded, it would be possible to look at the relation of the categories to experience from the standpoint of Hegel, and yet to leave as ample a place for personal reality and individual freedom as could be found in any possible Idealism.

Dr. Howison never allows his keen practical interest in his conclusions to masquerade as a reason for believing in them. "The unfavourable bearing of a doctrine on hopes indulged by man cannot alter the fact of their truth" (p. 5). But, he goes on to point out, "we have at least the right, and in the highest cases we have the duty, to demand that we shall know what its bearings on our highest interests are. If the truth bodes us ill that very ill-boding is part of the whole truth; and though, unquestionably, we should have to submit to it, even though it destroyed us, it cannot follow that we could approve of it, or that we ought to approve of it."

It is not, therefore, as an argument, but only as an important truth, that we are to count his very profound remark that only an eternal being can really be free. A being who is created (in the ordinary sense of the word) by another has his entire character determined by the will of that other being. It is to his creator, and not to himself, that his actions must in the last resort be attributed. On the other hand, a being who exists eternally in his own right acts from his own nature and from nothing else. This ensures that his action is really spontaneous, and, in the case of a conscious being, the spontaneity must take the form of choice. These two requisites are all which are required for freedom, since the freedom of caprice is equally impossible and undesirable (pp. 319, 332).

We must now consider the second question—among the eternal selves is there one, and one only, which is perfect, and which is rightly called God. Here Dr. Howison agrees very closely with Leibniz. Speaking of the number of souls he says "the series must certainly run through every *real* difference, from the lowest increment over non-existence to the absolute realisation of the ideal Type" (p. 354). Among the different grades which are thus really possible, and exist, Dr. Howison assumes that the highest grade of all—that of the ideal Type—is one, and consequently that a being exists

who realises the Type. (So far as I can see he does not attempt to prove this, and, indeed, it might be difficult to find a proof which did not prove too much, by demonstrating not only that the perfect being was possible, but that all others were impossible.) All the rest of the vast number of beings (a number, however, which is finite, p. 354) must be differentiated from the perfect being. And this can only be done by means of a degree of imperfection in each of them. "The personality of every soul lies precisely in the relation . . . between that genuine infinity (self-activity) which marks its organising essence, and the finitude, the exactly singular degree of limitation and passivity, to which the infinity subjects itself in defining itself from God" (p. 363). Thus there is one perfect being and one only.

The weakness of this argument, it seems to me, lies in the assumption that beings who were equally perfect could not be different from one another. What is there to prevent them from being equally perfect in different ways? This might, indeed, have been impossible for Leibniz, whose selves were monads, entirely isolated from one another. But Dr. Howison's selves are not monads. They are united in the City of God, and this not externally but as a necessary part of their nature. Outside that union they could neither exist nor be conceived. And in this more than organic unity differentiation need not involve—if, indeed, it does not exclude—the inferiority of one to another.

I cannot agree, therefore, with Dr. Howison in holding that only one being could be perfect. And, going further, I would venture to suggest two questions. We have been told that all the selves are eternal. Can that which is imperfect be eternal? Again, we have been told that all the selves form an intimate unity. Can one member of such a unity be perfect while the rest are imperfect?

On these grounds I should be inclined to say that not one but all of the souls in the City of God must be held to be perfect. If an opponent should remind me of the notorious imperfections in the present lives of each of us, I should point out that every self is, as Dr. Howison calls us, in reality eternal, and that its true qualities are only seen in so far as it is considered as eternal. *Sub specie aeternitatis*, every self is perfect. *Sub specie temporis*, it is progressing towards a perfection as yet unattained. The sceptic might find a difficulty in the assertion that the perfect manifests itself in the imperfect. But this should prove no difficulty to those who agree with Dr. Howison that the eternal manifests itself in the temporal.

Such a view as this would be condemned by Dr. Howison as "apeirotheism" (p. 361). I think that it would be more fitly called pantheism, since it would rather be the City of God than the individual souls which had replaced the personal God of orthodox theology. But I submit that the word God and its derivatives are inappropriate in describing both this view and that of Dr. Howison. Ever since the spread of Christianity God has meant, for the

western world, a person who is the sole self-existent being. Popular usage would not recognise as God any being who was not a person, or who was not the only self-existent being, by whom all things else were made. And, in the case of a word which is used by all mankind, philosophic usage should conform to that of ordinary life. It can only lead to confusion that Spinoza should have spoken of an impersonal Absolute as God. And it can, I think, only lead to confusion that Dr. Howison should apply the same name to a member of a community of self-existent souls, even though it is the only perfect member.

It is rather difficult to discover whether Dr. Howison considers that God's superiority over the other souls is permanent. That it should be permanent seems required by the general tenor of the argument and by the passage quoted above from page 363. On the other hand, in an earlier essay he speaks of the grace of God which "accords to its object the prospect of equality with the source of it" (p. 248). And again of the "potential equality with God" of all spirits.

I have left myself no room to comment on the other subjects touched on in this most remarkable work, but I cannot close without expressing a special admiration for the essay on the "Right Relation of Reason and Religion," and for the delicate and courteous humour of the remonstrance with Dr. William James (p. 372). For the book as a whole all students of philosophy will be grateful to the author, and, outside the ranks of specialists, it ought to attract much attention and do much good.

J. ELLIS McTAGGART.

Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology. By JOHN McTAGGART ELLIS McTAGGART, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer of Trinity College in Cambridge. Cambridge: University Press, 1901. Pp. xx., 292.

READERS of *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* must have been moved to hope for a complementary set of "studies" from the pen of its brilliant author when they read his short, but pregnant, final chapter on the practicability of applying the conclusions of Hegel's Logic to the solution of concrete problems. Such an application, it was there suggested in conformity with the Hegelian tradition, might have either of two objects—the determination of the nature of ultimate reality, or the interpretation of the facts of our daily life. These, then, are the two tasks that the present volume undertakes in a measure to fulfil. Cosmology means Applied Dialectic. And that, perhaps, is about as much as it does mean. So liberally indefinite is it in scope that it leaves us at liberty to range backwards and forwards as we will from heaven to our poor planet. At one moment we are at the sublime level of what M. Raoul de la Grasserie would call "Cosmosociology," as